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   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 19-1120 
______ 
 
SUSAN SILVER, MD; RICHARD DUCOTE, ESQ.;  
*VICTORIA MCINTYRE, ESQ., 
                                           Appellants 
v. 
 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, and THE HONORABLE 
KIM BERKELEY CLARK, in her official capacity 
 
*Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 12(a). 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2-18-cv-00494) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nora Barry Fischer 
____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 1, 2019 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 6, 2020) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________
  
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal concerns an exceptionally contentious child custody case.  Two ex-
spouses, Sammy Bertenthal and Susan Silver, disputed custody of their child in the Court 
of Common Pleas for Allegheny County.  After a 23-day trial, that court granted sole 
legal and physical custody to the father, Bertenthal.   
 The child’s mother, Silver, was not pleased with that result.  Along with her 
attorney, Richard Ducote, she launched a press release and held a press conference that 
went beyond simply announcing disagreement with the outcome of the trial.  Silver and 
Ducote used those opportunities to repeat highly charged allegations made at trial that 
Bertenthal had sexually abused the child.  The coverage of those allegations appeared on 
popular websites and later was the subject of an article in a local weekly newspaper.  
 Bertenthal responded by moving for sanctions and a gag order against Silver and 
Ducote in the Court of Common Pleas.  Silver attempted to remove that dispute to federal 
court, but the District Court rejected that effort.   
Undeterred, Silver and Ducote initiated a separate lawsuit in the District Court 
against the Common Pleas Court.  There, they sought immediate injunctive relief to 
prevent the Common Pleas Court from enjoining future speech or issuing sanctions.  The 
District Court denied those requests for emergency injunctive relief.   
The Common Pleas Court then issued an initial order governing the post-judgment 
conduct of the parties and counsel.  Through that order, the Court of Common Pleas 
prevented both parties and their counsel from publicly discussing the child custody case.   
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That order prompted more litigation – in federal court.  Silver and Ducote filed a 
motion to amend their complaint and moved again for a preliminary injunction.  Both 
requests were denied.   
Back at the state level, the Common Pleas Court entered a more targeted order 
after holding a hearing and making findings of fact.  That order prohibited Silver, Ducote, 
and Silver’s other counsel, Victoria McIntyre, from speaking publicly or communicating 
online about the case or encouraging others to do so.  It also required them to remove 
information they posted about the case from the internet.  The order further imposed an 
additional restriction on those three: if they were to testify before any legislative body, 
they could not provide information that would tend to identify the child.  Silver, Ducote, 
and McIntyre appealed that ruling to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.   
While that appeal was pending, Silver and Ducote returned to federal court 
seeking a new amendment to their complaint and a preliminary injunction.  But finding 
that amending the complaint would be futile, the District Court denied not only 
amendment but also all requested relief.  In reaching that result, the District Court relied 
on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Younger 
abstention.  Ultimately, the District Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint with 
prejudice.   
Meanwhile, Silver, Ducote, and McIntyre pressed forward with their state-court 
litigation.  The Superior Court rejected their constitutional challenges to the Common 
Pleas Court’s order.  See S.B. v. S.S., 201 A.3d 774, 783-84 (Pa. Super. Dec. 24, 2018).  
But then the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review of a single issue – the same 
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federal question they attempted to litigate in the District Court: whether the Common 
Pleas Court order violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  See 
S.B. v. S.S., No. 89 WAL 2019, 2019 WL 4291606 (Pa. Sept. 11, 2019).   
Even with that grant of review, Silver and Ducote did not abandon their efforts to 
litigate the same issue in federal court.  They appealed the District Court’s final judgment 
to this Court.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
The three issues on appeal here – the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, and Younger abstention – all constitute threshold barriers to 
federal court review of a controversy.  As threshold issues, those arguments need not be 
addressed in any particular sequence.  See Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l 
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (“[A] federal court has leeway ‘to choose 
among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.’”) (quoting 
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)).  And of the three threshold 
issues presented here, the most natural starting point is Younger abstention.  See id. at 431 
(explaining that a federal court need not “decide whether the parties present an Article III 
case or controversy before abstaining under Younger v. Harris”).    
Younger abstention operates as an exception to a federal court’s “virtually 
unflagging” obligation to hear and decide cases over which it has jurisdiction.  Sprint 
Commc’ns., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (quoting Colorado River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)); see also id. at 72 
(explaining that “[a]bstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court 
proceeding involves the same subject matter”).  But before Younger abstention “counsels 
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against federal relief,” the federal action must constitute an exceptional circumstance that 
would present “the prospect of undue interference with state proceedings.” Id. at 72.  One 
such exceptional circumstance occurs when there are pending “civil proceedings 
involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state court’s ability to 
perform their judicial functions.”  Id. at 73 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc. v. 
Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)).   
This case presents such an exceptional circumstance.  Unlike this Circuit’s 
decision in Malhan v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453 (3d Cir. 2019), the 
federal action here challenges an order uniquely in furtherance of a state court’s ability to 
perform judicial functions.  The state-court order attacked by Silver and Ducote governs 
the post-judgment conduct of attorneys and litigants.  See Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. 
v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432-33 (1982) (abstaining under Younger from 
deciding a state-court action implicating “the important state obligation to regulate 
persons who are authorized to practice law”).  And that order seeks to preserve the state 
court’s power to further one of its uniquely judicial functions – promoting and protecting 
the best interests of a child whose custody had been previously adjudicated by the court.  
See generally Kassam v. Kassam, 811 A.2d 1023, 1025 (Pa. Super. 2002) (explaining that 
Pennsylvania courts have a “duty of paramount importance to protect [a] child’s best 
interest and welfare” (quoting G.B. v. M.M.B., 670 A.2d 714, 715 (Pa. Super. Jan. 25, 
1996))).   
Even in an exceptional circumstance, three more showings – commonly referred to 
as the Middlesex factors – are required for Younger abstention.  See generally Middlesex 
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Cty., 457 U.S. at 432.  First, there must be ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in 
nature.  See Malhan, 938 F.3d at 462.  That is satisfied because Silver, Ducote, and 
McIntyre are parties to ongoing state court proceedings – their appeal before the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Second, the state proceedings must implicate important 
state interests.  See id.  That requirement is also met because “[f]amily relations are a 
traditional area of state concern,” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979), and 
Pennsylvania has a “duty of paramount importance” to protect the best interest of 
children in custody proceedings.  Kassam, 811 A.2d at 1025.  Third, the state proceedings 
must afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.  See Malhan, 938 F.3d at 
462.  The state proceedings here do just that.  This is not a situation in which a state court 
is “incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it” sufficient to 
create “an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief.”  Kugler 
v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975).  Rather, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
granted a discretionary appeal to address the very constitutional issues Silver and Ducote 
attempt to adjudicate in federal court.   
For these reasons, on plenary review, see Lui v. Comm’n. on Adult Entm’t 
Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2004), the District Court did not err in its 
legal analysis of the applicability of Younger abstention.  Consequently, we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court dismissing this case with prejudice on Younger 
grounds during the pendency of the state-court litigation.  
